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SUMMARY
Accelerating deforestation in many tropical countries with the
concomitant loss of plant species diversity incites increasing interna-
tional concern. Until very recently, international environmental law
tended to regard natural plant species as a "common heritage," a uni-
versal resource immune to private property claims. This common her-
itage approach to the problem of biodiversity loss has left the majority
of plant species in a jurisprudential void, unprotected by property
rights and subject to conflicting claims by countries with divergent
goals. Unrelieved economic pressures force impoverished peoples in
species-rich developing nations to resort to activities that ravage the
forests, and the tragedy of biodiversity loss continues to play itself out
on the global commons.
The United Nations Framework Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, concluded on June 5, 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, addressed
the worsening problem of global biodiversity loss and focused on cre-
ating economic incentives for developing nations to conserve species
diversity. Despite copious criticism and discordant interpretations of
the text, the Convention marks a discernible evolution in international
legal standards on plant diversity preservation. In manifesting nearly
uniform agreement on the principle that nations exercise sovereign
rights over plant genetic resources within their borders and deserve to
share in the benefits accruing from the exploitation of these resources,
the Convention rejects a decades-long attempt by many nations to
classify naturally-occurring plant genetic materials as a common heri-
tage of humanity. In adopting an approach which could recognize
intellectual property entitlements both in discovered or protected nat-
ural plant germplasm1 and in the end products of biotechnology re-
search, the Convention heralds a new direction for analyzing plant
genetic resources under international law.
More than 150 nations signed the Convention, with only the
United States refusing to participate in the final treaty.2 Several of the
Convention's clauses appearing to limit intellectual property rights in
technological products proved unacceptable to the U.S. government.
At the same time, though, the treaty's underlying philosophy, an im-
plicit acknowledgment of property entitlements in naturally-occurring
1. "Germplasm" refers generally to the hereditary information contained in the germ cells of
an organism.
2. U.S. Stands Alone in Rejecting Treaty After Major Industrial Partners Sign, Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA), at 414 (June 17, 1992) [hereinafter U.S. Stands Alone]; Eugene Robinson & Michael
Weisskopf, 'No'Leaves U.S. Isolated at Summit, WASH. PoST, June 6, 1992, at Al.
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plant materials, resonates with echoes of the U.S. plant patent regime
and can be compatibly aligned with U.S. law.
An international system of reciprocal intellectual property rights
in natural and improved plant germplasm combined with economic
inducements, in any of several possible forms, would benefit both de-
veloped and developing countries. Developing nations desire compen-
sation and technology transfers in exchange for the use of their natural
resources; industrialized countries seek continued access to new, un-
improved species and fiercely guard their grants of intellectual prop-
erty rights in technological products and processes. Licensing access
to raw germplasm would remunerate developing countries for the use
of their plant material and would ensure that companies and countries
that profit from the use of plant species pay for some of the costs of
conserving wild species.3 A system of property rights recognizing en-
titlements in plant genetic material and in the technology resulting
from modification of plant material would create incentives to con-
serve, continue inducements to invest in technologies, and focus on the
needs and interests of both developed and developing countries.
The Biodiversity Convention indicates a willingness to balance the
contributions and needs of developing countries wealthy in species di-
versity with those of industrialized nations. Recently, several private
companies have arranged to compensate developing countries for the
use of their natural plant materials. These instances of a growing
practice of recognizing the property rights of nations in their native
species, together with the near-global consensus on the essential phi-
losophy of the Biodiversity Convention, evidence an emerging legal
model that may achieve more success in preserving biodiversity and in
distributing benefits equitably among nations than the common heri-
tage approach of international environmental law.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING PLANT BIODIVERSITY
The crisis of global species depletion encompasses the quickening
extinction of plant and animal varieties, the accompanying genetic ero-
sion as their genes disappear forever, and the resulting genetic uni-
formity of species.4 This loss of biodiversity, the "death of birth,"5
assumes catastrophic proportions as species disappear from the earth
at a furiously increasing pace. Although no one knows the number of
3. JEFFREY A. MCNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BIODIVERSITY 118 (1990).
4. Eileen M. Baker, Patents, Plants, & Biotechnology: Policy & Law, 14 W. ST. L. REv. 529,
538 (1987). "Biodepletion" (genetic erosion) is the second critical aspect of the biodiversity prob-
lem. Norman Myers, Plugging the Gene Pool, NATURE, July 16, 1992, at 200.
5. Thomas Eisner, Chemical Prospecting: A Proposal for Action, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS,
AND ETHICS: THE BROKEN CIRCLE 196 (F. Herbert Bormann & Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991).
Another metaphor describing the loss of species biodiversity is captured in the title of an influen-
tial work: NORMAN MYERS, THE SINKING ARK (1979).
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current plant species "even to the nearest order of magnitude,"' 6 biolo-
gists estimate the existence of five to thirty million different species, of
incalculable value to human beings.7
Plant genetic resources, the chemical chromosomal information
carried in gene alleles of living plant cells, furnish the raw materials
for plant breeders and biotechnologists.8 Plant genetic materials pro-
vide valuable resources for human beings all over the world as sources
of fibers, petroleum substitutes, ornamentation, 9 and, particularly, of
pharmaceuticals and food crops.10
Scientists estimate that twenty-five percent of all drugs sold in the
United States over the past twenty-five years derive from plants 1 and
that more than eighty percent of the people in developing nations rely
on traditional medicine, of which eighty-five percent of the prepara-
tions are based on extracts from higher plants. 12 Worldwide, approxi-
mately 3.5 - 4 billion people rely on medications deriving from
plants. 13 The rosy periwinkle of Madagascar, for example, yields two
compounds used to treat Hodgkin's disease and juvenile leukemia with
great success.14 Researchers and scientists have only begun to tap the
6. Edward 0. Wilson, Biodiversity, Prosperity, and Value, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS:
THE BROKEN CIRCLE 4 (F. Herbert Bormann & Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991). About 1.4 mil-
lion plant, animal, and micro-organisms have been scientifically named. Paul R. Ehrlich & Ed-
ward 0. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy, SCIENCE, Aug. 16, 1991, at 758. Yet,
this figure includes perhaps only 10% of existing species. EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE DIvERsITY
OF LIFE 273 (1992). Scientists "find it difficult to come up with even an approximate estimate of
the hemorrhaging because we know so little about diversity in the first place. Extinction is the
most obscure and local of all biological processes." Id. at 207.
7. Edward 0. Wilson, The Current State of Biological Diversity, in BIODIVERsrrY 3, 14 (Ed-
ward 0. Wilson ed., 1988).
8. H. Garrison Wilkes, Plant Genetic Resources Over Ten Thousand Years, in SEEDS AND
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 67, 79 (Jack R.
Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988).
9. Recently, researchers have been trying to develop flowers which won't wilt as quickly by
searching for the genetic signal to switch off production of the ethylene responsible for bi-
odegradation. If Love Can Last, Why Not Flowers?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1992, at A14.
10. Wilson, supra note 7, at 8. There are many other motivations apart from existing and
potential economic benefits of plant resources to conserve living species, such as aesthetic and
moral reasons. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES TO MAINTAIN BIOLOGI-
CAL DIVERSITY 27 (1987). Also, one theory maintains that instability in countries such as Haiti
and El Salvador is due in part to the destruction of natural resources in those areas. Id. at 286.
Still, economic arguments for preservation of biodiversity tend to gather thi strongest support for
conservation goals. NORMAN MYERS, A WEALTH OF WILD SPECIES 10 (1983).
11. Norman R. Farnsworth, Screening Plants for New Medicines, in BIODIVERSrrY 83 (Ed-
ward 0. Wilson ed., 1988). In 1985 Americans bought over 8 billion dollars worth of
pharmaceuticals obtained from plant extracts. Id. Worldwide, sales of plant-based prescription
and non-prescription medicines topped 40 billion U.S. dollars. MYERS, supra note 10, at 96.
12. Farnsworth, supra note 11, at 83.
13. Id. at 91. The bark of the cinchona tree has been known to combat malaria since the time
of the Incas. Eisner, supra note 5, at 197.
14. Birds and Bees, THE ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 15, 17 (survey following p. 54) ("one
of the most quoted examples" of the potential value of unimproved germplasm). Before the dis-
covery of the rosy periwinkle in 1960, a child afflicted with leukemia had a I in 5 chance of
survival; today that rate is 4 in 5. MYERS, supra note 10, at 96. Foxglove (digitalis) has achieved
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vast chemical storehouse of plant genetics for medicinal products. 15
The loss of a species entails the loss of a unique set of chemicals and
genetic materials not likely to be invented by human beings.1 6 Among
the unexplored wealth of plant species may lie the components of in-
numerable potential vaccines and drugs needed to protect humanity
against present and future diseases.17
Preservation of plant genetic diversity also plays a crucial role in
agriculture. Landraces, traditional peasant farming crops, consist of
varieties of wild strains containing heterogenous genetic information
and manifesting diverse characteristics and different immunities to
plant diseases.18 Modem industrial modes of agricultural production
concentrate heavily on a few commercial crops which perform well in
mass farming but exhibit genetic uniformity. Since uniform species
run a high risk of vulnerability to new pests and pathogens,19 plant
breeders seek to generate disease-resistance or other traits in their hy-
brids by crossing plants with their wild and weedy natural relatives.20
To continue to develop viable crop varieties, breeders and seed compa-
nies need access to a wide array of indigenous, genetically diverse
plant species evolving in their local environments.
Unfortunately, the Green Revolution caused many subsistence
farmers to replace their traditional, genetically variable landraces with
uniform, high-yielding varieties based on native landraces. 21 The de-
similar fame as the source of cardiotonic preparations. Eisner, supra note 5, at 197. Dioscorea, a
plant native to India, produces precursors to cortisone and progesterone and could serve as a
contraceptive if developed in a higher yield strain. LEE DURRELL, STATE OF THE ARK 93
(1986). Modem commercial aspirin is synthesized from a chemical template of a willow tree
extract. MYERS, supra note 10, at 92.
15. Only an estimated 1% of the flowering plants on the planet have been assayed and
phytochemically examined for potential uses. MYERS, supra note 10, at 94.
16. Eisner, supra note 5, at 197.
17. Smith-Kline Beecham Pharmaceuticals announced the discovery in China and India of a
tree which provides a compound potentially useful in attacking lung and ovarian cancers. Wil-
liam K. Stevens, Shamans and Scientists Seek Cures in Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at Cl,
C9. Also, the neem tree of India, a relative of mahogany, is used to cure a wide array of aches
and infections and has not yet been examined for chemical compounds. WILSON, supra note 6, at
285.
18. Miguel A. Altieri & Laura C. Merrick, Acroecology and In Situ Conservation of Native
Crop Diversity in the Third World, in BIODIVERSiTY 361, 362 (Edward 0. Wilson ed., 1988).
19. Jack Kloppenburg Jr. & Daniel L. Kleinman, Preface: Plant Genetic Resources: The
Common Bowl, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES 1, 6 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). Examples of the consequences of species
vulnerability include the Irish potato crop failure in 1846-47 and the U.S. southern corn leaf
blight of 1970 which wrought $1 billion worth of damage. Id. at 6-7.
20. Altieri & Merrick, supra note 18, at 362.
21. Id. at 361. The amount of land in developing countries devoted to cultivating these
highly productive but genetically uniform specialized varieties increased 40% from 1960 to 1980.
Birds and Bees, supra note 14, at 16. More than 70% of agricultural land in the world is devoted
to cereal production. MARTIN INGROUILLE, DIVERSITY AND EVOLUTION OF LAND PLANTS 291
(1992).
The replacement of variable landraces with uniform breeding varieties can lead to a drastic
decrease in the stock of landraces needed for response to pests and pathogens, sometimes with
[Vol. 14:322
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velopment of future crop strains able to withstand diseases depends on
the continued cultivation of evolving landraces, but native farmers
often prefer to raise more profitable, commercial agricultural varieties.
Similarly, the maintenance of the global chemical storehouse of plant
genetic information depends upon the preservation of the tropical rain
forests, even though people in tropical countries receive money from
sources outside their countries for logging, agriculture, mining, oil ex-
ploration, and other activities which destroy the forests.
Two-thirds of existing plant species are located in the developing
world.22 The majority of plant species grow in the tropical moist for-
ests, which cover only six percent of the earth's surface area,23 and fall
primarily within the borders of developing nations. 24 As the pressures
of foreign debt and increasing population push the people of species-
rich developing countries to try to improve their agricultural output,
they seek more and more arable land.25 Deforestation, the largest
threat to biodiversity, stems mainly from attempts to cultivate land in
order to pay off debts, buy manufactured goods from industrial na-
tions, attain economic self-sufficiency, and support exploding popula-
tions at subsistence levels. 26 Thus, the pressures leading to unchecked
devastating consequences. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 19, at 9. In 1991 genetic uni-
formity led to the "worst outbreak of citrus canker ever recorded" in Brazil, and almost 80% of
the vegetable varieties used in the United States 100 years ago have since disappeared. WWF
Urges Governments to Protect Wild Food Crops to Ensure World Food Security, Int'l Envtl. Rep.(BNA), at 364 (Jun. 3, 1992) [hereinafter WWF Urges Governments]. Rice breeders in the Philip-
pines have suffered from the same phenomenon. Many switched to a different variety of rice
when the Taiwanese strain they had been using showed certain susceptibilities to disease. Discov-
ering that the second hybrid could not withstand high winds, they decided to replant the original
variety but found that Taiwanese farmers had also all planted the "improved" version. As native
farmers had ceased to cultivate it, the original variety vanished forever. CALESTOUS JUMA, THE
GENE HUNTERs: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SCRAMBLE FOR SEEDS 100-01 (1989).
22. Biodiversity: Variety is the Spice of Life, 29 U.N. CHRON. 52, 53 (June 1992).
23. Wilson, Biodiversity, Prosperity, and Value, supra note 6, at 5. Human activity has al-
ready reduced the tropical forest by 45%, and about 100,000 square kilometers (approximately
the areas of Switzerland and the Netherlands combined) go up in flames or are felled for timber
each year. Id. at 6. 93% of Madagascar's forests has already vanished, and 99% of Brazil's
Atlantic coastal forests has disappeared. Wilson, supra note 7, at 10. The rate of deforestation in
1989 was 90% greater than that in 1979. Norman Myers, Viewpoint, 41 BIOSCIENCE 282 (1991).
"At this rate, most of the rain forest of the world will be gone within 30 years." Wilson, Biodiver-
sity, Prosperity, and Value, supra note 6, at 6.
24. Baker, supra note 4 at 539.
25. Cameron Tyler, International Conservation of Plant Genetic Resources, 11 I.L.S.A. J.
INT'L L. 41, 54 (1987). Twenty years ago, Africa produced enough grain to feed itself, but it now
finds itself a food importer as its rate of population increase outstrips that of its rate of cultiva-
tion. JUMA, supra note 21 at 25. Population in the Brazilian state of Rondonia in the southern
Amazonia has skyrocketed in 12 years from 110,000 to over one million, mainly due to the influx
of migrant farmers. Whereas 1,250 square kilometers had been cleared from the area as of 1975,
more than 16,000 square kilometers had been razed by 1985. Norman Myers, Draining the Gene
Pool: the Causes, Course, and Consequences of Genetic Erosion, in SEEDS & SOVEREIGNTY: THE
USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 90, 102-03 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed.,
1988).
26. Michael H. Robinson, Are There Alternatives to Destruction?, in BIODIVERsITY 355 (Ed-
ward 0. Wilson ed., 1988). Statistics bear out the assertion that the major impetus for deforesta-
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deforestation and the extinction of innumerable species are mainly
economic.
Appealing to developing countries to forego potential sources of
income or to assume voluntarily the costs of conserving native lan-
draces and tropical forests is unrealistic. 27 No global authority obli-
gates nations to preserve natural resources contained entirely within
their own borders. 28 In order to spur conservation of genetic materials
and plant species, economic incentives need to be designed to counter-
balance the economic forces leading to the destruction of natural
habitats.29
II. PREVIOUS ANALYSIS OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Classifying Plant Species as a Common Heritage of Humanity
Exotic plant species found in nature have historically been free to
the taker. Since the Age of Exploration researchers and travelers have
brought discovered plant species back to their own countries as new
foods30 and as raw material for plant breeding. Although naturally-
occurring plant genetic resources are now often treated as subjects of
free exchange among nations, industrial countries with intellectual
property systems protect plant-derived breeding and bioengineering
products developed by their seed and pharmaceutical companies.
Less-developed nations complain that researchers from large mul-
tinational corporations freely prospect in the tropical forests for native
landraces and new species and then sell expensive, patented varieties
and biotechnology based on the native species back to developing
countries.3 ' These nations' assertions of unfair exploitation have en-
tion comes from a "hungry farmer." MYERS, supra, note 10, at 101. The damage also stems from
other activities aimed at relieving economic pressures. The Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)
reports that oil exploration in the Amazonian region of Ecuador, for example, is causing the
disappearance of wild strains of cacao, needed for producing chocolate. WWF Urges Govern-
ments, supra note 21, at 364. Still, small-scale farming causes by far the most deforestation.
MYERS, supra note 10, at 282.
27. These countries have "little incentive, other than altruism" to protect biodiversity. Roger
A. Sedjo, Property Rights and the Protection of Plant Genetic Resources, in SEEDS AND SOVER-
EIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 293, 312 (Jack R. Kloppen-
burg, Jr. ed., 1988).
28. Tyler, supra note 25, at 53.
29. Birds and Bees, supra note 14, at 17.
30. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 19, at 4. The great "Columbian exchange"
brought the tomato to Italian cuisine and introduced the potato to Ireland and Russia, trans-
forming these cultures. Before the arrival of potato-based vodka, Russians drank fermented
grapes with a slab of meat tossed in as flavoring. Mary Talbot, "Potato: How It Shaped the
World," NEWSWK., Fall/Winter 1991, special issue, at 60.
31. Charles F. Murphy, InstitutionalResponsibility of the National Plant Germplasm System,
in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 204,
213-14 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). See also, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
supra note 10, at 25.
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gendered deep bitterness and political controversy between the "rich,
but gene-poor North" and the "poor, but gene-rich South."' 32 The
deep resentment harbored by many developing countries found expres-
sion in a resolution, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources, passed by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization (FAO) in 1983 deeming all plant germplasm the "common
heritage of mankind." 33 Developing nations maintained that, so long
as their raw plant germplasm remained freely available to other na-
tions, they could lay equal claim to "special genetic stocks," including
breeders' lines protected by patents and plant breeders' rights certifi-
cates in the developed world..3 4
Industrial nations either completely rejected the Undertaking's
principles or made express reservations to provisions dealing with the
absence of breeders' rights.35 That the ensuing controversy over con-
trol of plant genetics has been termed "seed wars" testifies to the depth
of discord on the issue.36 According to critics, the Undertaking po-
larized nations instead of seeking compromise, and failed to motivate
states to conserve and to grapple with the difficult issues of access to
germplasm. 37 In fact, most industrial nations already belonged to the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV), 38 a multilateral convention created to set uniform, minimum
standards for plant breeders' rights and to safeguard breeders' inter-
ests. 39 Eight UPOV nations at the FAO Conference protested that the
Undertaking contravened existing law - both national plant breeders'
rights legislation and the UPOV treaty - and reserved to the
Undertaking.40
32. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 19, at 3. "Whereas germplasm flows out of the
South as the 'common heritage of mankind,' it returns as a commodity." Id. at 10. Although this
conflict is often phrased as a division between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, the
phrase is misleading. Most centers of rich biodiversity are actually located north of the equator.
Jack R. Harlan, Seeds & Sovereignty: An Epilogue, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND
CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 356, 356-57 (Jack R. Kloppenburg ed., 1988).
33. International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, FAO Res. 8/83, reprinted in BA-
SIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 113-18 (Harald Hohmann ed.,
1992).
34. Thomas E. Jurgensen, Of Plants, Patents, and Breeders' Rightr" Some Proposals for Inter-
national Unification of Proprietary Protection of Plant Biotechnology, 12 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & L.
291, 314 (1991).
35. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 19, at 8. Tyler, supra note 25, at 68.
36. JUMA, supra note 21, at 169.
37. Tyler, supra note 25, at 69.
38. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33U.S.T. 2703. The treaty takes its acronym from the French title (Union Internationale pour le
Protection des Obtentions Vig~tales) [hereinafter UPOV].
39. Id. at pmbl. Over nineteen nations have ratified UPOV, which now numbers the United
States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Israel, and "the major countries of
Western Europe" among its members. William L. Hayhurst, Exclusive Rights in Relation to
Living Things, 6 INTELL. PROP. J. 171, 179 (1991).
40. Harold J. Bordwin, The Legal and Political Implications of the International Undertaking
Winter 1993]
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Many developed countries perceived the common heritage premise
of the Undertaking as an assault on their private property systems.41These nations clung fiercely to their intellectual property systems, and
remained unwilling to relinquish them in the face of a global call toplant communism.42 Thus, the Undertaking's common heritage ap-proach did not prevent industrial countries from protecting their intel-lectual property rights in plants, and it failed to win any sort of
compensation for developing countries that protect their plant
species.43
B. Imperfections of the Common Heritage Model as Applied to
Plant Genetic Resources
Plant germplasm, often treated as national or private property,falls outside the scope of the traditional definition of a common heri-tage of humanity. The common heritage principle was first enunciatedin the Law of the Sea negotiations.44 It has since gained universal
acceptance in areas, such as the deep sea-bed, the lunar surface, orAntarctica, which fall outside of the jurisdiction of any one state and
not yet subject to exploitation.45 However, as plants grow within na-tional borders, sovereign nations can exercise de facto ownership oftheir national germplasm collections and choose to exploit or preserve
their native species as they please.46 Nations may and do set export
restrictions on the transfer of native plant germplasm, albeit with va-
rying degrees of success.47 Furthermore, the legal structures of many
countries do recognize personal property rights in living organisms.48
Even if plant germplasm unequivocally fit the common heritage
on Plant Genetic Resources, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1053, 1069 (1985). The United States, for exam-ple, would not have been able to join the original Undertaking without changing its domesticlaws on plant breeders' rights or expressing major reservations to the text. OFFIcE OF TECHNOL-
OGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 10, at 26.
41. Jack Kloppenburg, Jr. & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Seeds of Controversy: National PropertyVersus Common Heritage, in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANTGENETIC RESOURCES 173-74 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). Bordwin, supra note 40, at1065.
42. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra, note 41, at 192.
43. Carlos M. Correa, Biological Resources and Intellectual Property Rights, 14 E.I.P.R. 15(1992).
44. JUMA, supra note 21, at 172.
45. The Common Heritage Principle and the World Heritage Principle, in BIODIVERSITY ANDINTERNATIONAL LAW 86 (Simone Bilderbeek ed., 1992); MYERS, supra note 10, at 98.
46. Harlan, supra note 32, at 361.
47. Id. Although countries exercise jurisdiction over their species, this right to physical con-trol differs from an intellectual property right. At present, a researcher who successfully smug-gles out a plant sample (a fairly frequent occurrence) may use it to develop profitable products
with impunity. A species-rich nation which has an intellectual property right in germplasm,though, could prohibit certain uses of the plant genetic material even beyond its borders.
48. One may own a pet, capture an animal and sell it to a zoo, or prevent others from takingapples from one's tree. "The concept of ownership of plant products is as old as trade inseeds .... " Donald N. Duvick & William L. Brown, Plant Germplasm and the Economics of
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model, the tragedy of the commons would reason in favor of its priva-
tization.49 When no ownership rights in plant species exist, economic
incentives stimulating individuals or countries to overexploit plant
species outweigh the inducements to preserve natural habitats.50 In
many developing countries, economic values subordinate conservation
impulses, and only those who find it in their self-interest to protect
diversity do SO. 5 1 In sum, the classification of plant genetic materials
as a common heritage, as advocated by the initial FAO Undertaking,
would not solve and would perhaps even exacerbate the problem of
protecting plant species diversity from inadvertent destruction.52
The attempted denial of private property in plant germplasm was
doomed from the start. Private companies rely on sales to recoup re-
search investment costs and reap profits, and countries with seed in-
dustries eagerly endorse the concept of guaranteed free access to the
raw germplasm but refuse to surrender their competitive superiority.5 3
Even if developing countries could convince industrial states to en-
gage in free global exchange of all plant germplasm, developing na-
tions still would not necessarily gain much. The advanced breeding
lines these countries claim to desire are technologically sophisticated
but often designed specifically for industrial, energy-intensive agricul-
ture.54 "Access to a Funk Seed Company sorghum line... [with] a
bacterial gene added which provides resistance to a proprietary herbi-
Agriculture, in BIOTIC DIVERSITY AND GERMPLASM PRESERVATION, GLOBAL IMPERATIVES
505, 506 (Lloyd Knutson & Allan K. Stoner eds., 1989).
49. In his classic essay, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Garrett Hardin argued that the
natural tendency of all individuals to maximize their own profits will lead to the systematic
overexploitation of free, common resources. According to Hardin, rational, profit-seeking people
will choose to pollute common waters and air spaces as long as the cost to them of purifying their
discharges outweighs their proportionate burdens of enduring a polluted environment. Similarly,
self-interested individuals benefit from extracting the maximum possible gains from a common
resource, even if that will eventually destroy the resource for society as a whole. Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
50. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 300.
51. Malcolm Gillis, Economics, Ecology, and Ethics: Mending the Broken Circle for Tropical
Forests, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE BROKEN CIRCLE, 162 (F. Herbert Bormann &
Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1990). "[I]n the impoverished countries of the Third World, wildlife that
demonstrably pays its way in the marketplace is more likely to be vouchsafed a place in thefuture than wildlife perceived to be devoid of commercial value: price-less, far from connoting
priceless, quickly comes to mean worthless." Norman Myers, Biological Diversity and Global
Security, in ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE BROKEN CIRCLE, 11 (F. Herbert Bormann &
Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991).
52. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 294.
53. William L. Brown, Plant Genetic Resources: A View from the Seed Industry, in SEEDS
AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 218, 225 (Jack
R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). "To ask that an elite parental line which costs a company several
hundred thousand dollars to develop be [freely] exchanged for cultivars of limited or unknown
potential is simply not reasonable, and seed companies will not agree to such an arrangement."
Id.
54. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 41, at 194.
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cide produced by Funk's corporate parent"5 5 would probably be of
little service to a state unable to afford an expensive, proprietary herbi-
cide. Tropical countries might benefit more by claiming a property
right in the plant genes underlying advanced breeding lines with a
view towards demanding royalties when they are sold to agricultural
industries. A system of patent-like breeders' and farmers' rights
would provide the most promising options for resolving the present
geopolitical impasse while improving the position of peoples in devel-
oping nations.56
C. Turning Away from the Common Heritage Approach
As arguments against the common heritage model of biodiversity
resounded increasingly convincingly, as developing countries evi-
denced differing resources and needs which divided them, and as in-
dustrial nations firmly defended their grants of property rights, the
international challenge to private property interests in plants inevita-
bly began to abate.
The 26th FAO Conference amended the Undertaking on Novem-
ber 25, 1991 to admit the principle that "the concept of mankind's
heritage, as applied in the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources, is subject to the sovereignty of the states over their plant
genetic resources."' 57 This amendment signalled a retreat from the
Undertaking's original, explicit disavowal of intellectual property
rights in any plant forms by referring to plant breeders' rights and
farmers' rights.58 Since the intellectual property rights laws of many
countries permit the patenting only of invented, not discovered, plant
varieties, 59 recognizing the sovereign rights of nations over their plant
materials effectively allowed only improved varieties and breeding
stocks to be sheltered under proprietary rights systems. Only natu-
rally-occurring plant species remained accepted as part of the global
common heritage. Thus, developing nations did not receive any bene-
fits as compensation for their own efforts in preserving agricultural
cultivars and natural forest areas, while industrial nations continued
to affirm the rights of their companies to profit from their work in
biotechnology research on plants.
The debate on the value of the common heritage approach contin-
ues. Some contemporary legal scholars argue that biodiversity re-
sources still ought to be considered part of a global holding.6° In
55. Id. at 193.
56. Id. at 199.
57. Report of the Conference of FAO, Genetic Resources and Biological Diversity, Annex 3,
at 1, U.N. Doc. C91/REP (1991).
58. Id.
59. See infra Part III (C)(2).
60. See, eg., Roseanne Eshbach, A Global Approach to the Protection of the Environment:
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recent debates in the European Parliament, opponents of proposed
biotechnology patents resisted the prospect of permitting patents on
wild species in the belief that natural genetic resources constitute a
common heritage of humanity. 61 In spite of the continuing contro-
versy, though, many developing countries have begun to turn away
from the common heritage theory and to focus on their sacrifices and
efforts in conserving plant life as the foundation of a different structure
of entitlements.
III. THE 1992 U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY
A. Interpretations of the Biodiversity Convention
On June 5, 1992 the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development concluded the Framework Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 62 At the end of "arduous and
acrimonious negotiations," over twenty nations expressed major reser-
vations about the final text. 63 Nonetheless, over 150 countries, includ-
ing all the major global powers except the United States, eventually
signed the Convention.
No consensus truly exists as to the Convention's likely effects. 65
The document probably either serves as a "declaration of good inten-
Balancing State Sovereignty and Global Interests, 4 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 271, 280 (1990)(that the global environment is the common heritage of humanity, and states can not "exercise
rights over their resources without 'due regard to the corresponding rights of others' "); Gary D.
Myers, Surveying the Lay of the Land, Air, and Water, 3 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 479,
578 (1992) (that national sovereign control over biological resources is not the proper way to
preserve biodiversity); Kathryn Rackleff, Note, Preservation of Biological Diversity, 3 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 405 (1992) (that "world leaders are beginning to recognize the earth's
biological diversity as a global commons").
61. Vote on Proposal to Protect Biotech Patents Delayed to Ensure No Conflict with Rio
Treaty, Int'l Envt'l. Rep. (BNA), at 398 (June 17, 1992).
62. United Nations Environmental Program, Convention on Biological Diversity (June 5,
1992) (copy on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law) [hereinafter, Convention].
63. Nations Forge Biodiversity Convention that is 'Flawed' Rio Support Doubtful Int'l, Envtl.
Rep. (BNA), at 346 (June 3, 1992). "As so often happens in the UN, the negotiation process...
turned into something of a soccer game, with the developed.., and the developing countries...
booting the ball back and forth." Rodger Schlickeisen, Protecting the Earth's Genetic Library,
WASH. PosT, May 24, 1992, at C7.
64. Rudy Abramson, Earth Summit Ends on Optimistic Note, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at
A4. Sally Lehrman, Genentech's Stance on Biodiversity Riles Staff, NATURE, July 9, 1992, at 97.
How many of the signatory nations will ratify the Convention remains an interesting question.
The treaty requires the deposit of 30 instruments of ratification before it can come into force.
Convention, supra note 62, art. 36. Whether Japan and Western European countries uncomforta-
ble with the language on intellectual property rights but anxious to avoid the spotlight of criti-
cism at Rio will eventually ratify remains to be seen. Perhaps in the long run the United States
will not be the only non-participant to the Convention.
65. Richard Stone, The Biodiversity Treaty: Pandora's Box or Fair Deal?, SCIENCE, June 19,
1992, at 1624.
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tions which is very generic and open to interpretation, ' 66 or is "too
vague to be threatening. ' 67 Viewed most positively, it can be consid-
ered a "framework within which more comprehensive agreements
might be reached." '68
Consensus exists, by contrast, on the general philosophy of the
treaty.69 The Convention most likely exhibits general agreement on a
reciprocity theory - that countries which sacrifice to conserve natural
species, as well as countries whose industries transform raw germ-
plasm into useful products, should be entitled to receive a portion of
the profits from the sale of these products. The Convention acknowl-
edges the existence of intellectual property rights in plant germ-
plasm,70 and repeated assertions throughout the text proclaim the
sovereign rights of states over biological resources within their bor-
ders.71 In addition, the text obliges pharmaceutical, agricultural, and
biotechnological industries to pay nations supplying plant germplasm
with royalties and licensing of technology. 72 Thus, the Convention
implicitly disavows the theory that genetic resources constitute a com-
mon heritage of humanity, not private property, because their benefits
reach beyond national borders.
The Convention's proponents and detractors alike point out the
text's imperfections and its weak and imprecise wording. 73 It is
neither clear that the Convention creates a duty to conserve wild spe-
cies nor obvious that such an obligation would be concrete and specific
enough to be enforceable.74 Many of the "obligations" articulated in
66. Industry Officials Call Biodiversity Treaty Vague, See Little Impact on Competitiveness,
Other Areas, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 511 (July 29, 1992).
67. Id. It has also been characterized as "[slo watered down as to do no harm." Two Success-
ful Weeks at Rio, NATURE, June 18, 1992, at 523.
68. Id at 524.
69. Maura Dolan & Rudy Abramson, Earth Summit Ends on Note of Hope, Not Achieve-
ment, L.A. TIMEs, June 14, 1992, at A18.
70. Convention, supra note 62, art. 16(2) ("the adequate and effective protection of intellec-
tual property rights"); Id. art. 16(5) ("recognizing that patents and other intellectual property
rights may have an influence on the implementation of this Convention").
71. "Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to
determine access to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to na-
tional legislation." Id. art. 15(l). Also see id. pmbl and art. 3.
72. Id. arts. 1, 15, 16.
73. "The convention on biological diversity shows every sign of having been negotiated by
the B-team from most countries, while the A-team was preoccupied with the convention on
global warming." The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, THE ECONOMIsT, June 13, 1992, at 93. The
International Environmental Reports labelled the text "flawed and vague." Nations Forge Bi-
odiversity Convention That is "Flawed,' supra note 63, at 346. Others declared that "[sltronger
language may have been preferable, and some disturbing elements remain." Biodiversity after
UNCED: Next Steps, BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION STRATEGY UPDATE, July 1992, at 1. The
LA. Times labelled it a "contradictory declaration laden with platitudes." Dolan & Abramson,
supra note 69, at A18. Another detractor claimed that the document contains "wording... so
vague that no one actually knows what it means." Andy Coghlan, Biodiversity Convention a
'Lousy Deal,' Says US., NEW SciEwrisT, July 4, 1992, at 9.
74. Some of the Convention's supporters, though, do aver that the treaty creates for the first
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the text relate to technology transfers and financial aid to developing
countries rather than to any duties to preserve biodiversity. 75 More-
over, the degree to which the Convention will achieve status as a le-
gally binding document remains uncertain.76
Spongy phrasing and vague clauses dilute much of the purported
obligations contained in the Convention to merely precatory state-
ments. Several of the Convention's provisions either set out require-
ments which countries should merely "endeavour" to fUlll 7 7 or
require performance only "as far as possible and as appropriate. '78
Article 12 directs contracting states to "tak[e] into account the special
needs of developing countries," without providing further guidance as
to the contours and weight of these needs. 79 Not only are the Conven-
tion obligations "soft," with uncertain impacts, according to some
critics, but the document limits itself to aiming at national conserva-
tion measures instead of addressing the biodiversity problem in global
terms. 80
B. The United States Perspective on the Biodiversity Convention
Despite the ambiguous wording of the Convention's provisions and
its likely ineffectiveness as a binding legal document, most of the world
was willing to accept the treaty, at least as an exposition of general
principles. The United States, though, chose to dissent and risk a
"public relations disaster" 81 because of a perception that the text
worked against United States interests. The text of the Convention,
according to a U.S. State Department Release, is "seriously flawed in a
number of respects,"'8 2 and its provisions on funding did not meet U.S.
time a legal obligation to conserve biodiversity. Fred Pearce, Last-Minute Compromise Saves
Biodiversity Treaty, NEW SCIENTST, May 30, 1992, at 6.
75. "The developed country Parties [to the treaty] shall provide new and additional financial
resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the... costs... of implementing measures
which fulfill the obligations of this Convention." Convention, supra note 62, art. 20(2). Also, see
id. arts. 16(1), 16(4), 20(2).
76. The Convention, to be legally binding on its signatories, will only enter into force when at
least 30 nations ratify it. Id. 36(1). However, "the extent to which developing country Parties will
effectively implement their commitments" under the Convention is left explicitly conditioned
upon their receipt of financial support and technology from the developed world. Id. art. 20(4).
77. See, eg., id. arts. 8(i), 15(2), 15(6).
78. Id. arts. 5, 7-11, 14.
79. Article 20(5) stands as a prime example of obfuscating emptiness: "The Parties shall take
full account of the specific needs and special situation of least developed countries in their actions
with regard to funding and transfer of technology." Id. art. 20(5).
80. Nations Forge Biodiversity Convention That is "Flawed,' supra note 63, at 347. A
"hodgepodge of provisions advocated by the two sides," the treaty resulted from "efforts... to
water it down to a vague and meaningless initiative that would have no significant benefit for
wildlife." Schlickeisen, supra note 63, at C7.
81. The Earth Summit, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 42.
82. Convention on Biological Diversity, 3 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH 423
(1992).
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expectations.8 3 In addition, the State Department declared that "[tlhe
convention focuses on [intellectual property rights] as a constraint to
the transfer of technology rather than as a prerequisite."
4
The argument that some provisions of the Convention would con-
travene domestic laws is valid from a U.S. legal perspective. Article
16(5), for instance, directly conflicts with U.S. legal interests by simul-
taneously affirming, while qualifying, existing intellectual property
rights:
The Contracting Parties, recognizing that patents and other intellectual
property rights may have an influence on the implementation of this
Convention, shall cooperate in this regard subject to national legislation
and international law in order to ensure that such rights are supportive
of and do not run counter to its objectives.
The "objectives" of the Convention include the preservation of bi-
odiversity and the "fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
out of the utilization of genetic resources. ' 85 Thus, the text acknowl-
edges the existence and validity of intellectual property rights, with the
apparent limitation that these rights not interfere with the "fair and
equitable sharing" of the advantages of technological and agricultural
products. According to the treaty, then, patents would be respected
only where they do not prevent universal distribution of patented
products. Moreover, article 16(5) permits "national legislation" to
limit obligations to respect intellectual property rights even further.
Article 16(4) similarly may be read as permitting the abrogation of
full grants of intellectual property rights. It directs party countries to
undertake measures to force private industries to transfer technology
to private institutions and governments in developing countries.
8 6 For
the United States this would entail implementing additional domestic
legislation regulating private technological firms and possibly creating
new causes of action in U.S. courts.
87
At present, industries acquire biological materials from developing
nations primarily on a commercial basis. Home to both the most prof-
itable and developed biotechnology industry in the world and a strong
property rights system, the United States prefers to allow market
forces, rather than administrative regulations, to influence contracts
between U.S. companies and gene-rich nations.88 Some U.S. critics
83. According to the United States, text provisions contain "unacceptable language on the
transfer of funds from developed to developing countries." Id.
84. Id.
85. Convention, supra note 62, art. 1.
86. "Each Contracting Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures.. . with
the aim that the private sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of technol-
ogy. . . for the benefit of both governmental institutions and the private sector of developing
countries." Id. art. 16(4).
87. Stone, supra, note 65, at 1624.
88. Treaty: US. Deals Blow to Pact on Wildlife, Habitat, L.A. TIMEs, May 30, 1992, at A6;
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objected that the Convention steers away from free market arrange-
ments, instead emphasizing national and international legislation to
regulate commerce in plant germplasm.8 9 The U.S. government be-
lieves that private companies negotiating with countries for plant re-
sources might lose competitive advantages if the government signed
the Convention 9o and that, by refusing to sign, the United States
avoided binding its companies to any open and unsettled
arrangements. 91
Article 15(7) also appears inimical to U.S. patent law standards.
This provision mandates "sharing in a fair and equitable way the re-
sults of research and development and the benefits arising from the
commercial and other utilization of genetic resources with the Con-
tracting Party providing such resources."' 92 Exactly what "fair and
equitable" sharing would be in this context is unclear. Normally,
transfer of the benefits of technology occurs either by contract or by
compulsory licensing provisions of patent law. Presumably, U.S. pat-
ent licensing standards would be "unfair" and invalid internationally
under this treaty if enough other countries found them overly restric-
tive. The United States has taken the position that this article would
permit countries to disregard patent rights or to claim a share of the
patent benefits of products derived from their natural resources even
in the absence of any royalty contract.93
Some supporters of the treaty accused the United States of "read-
ing demons" into the text,94 and several of its allies greeted with skep-
ticism the U.S. interpretations of the Convention's clauses as hostile to
intellectual property rights in technology.95 Article 16(2), which men-
tions "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights," 96 highlights this problem of construction. The Convention
lacks any definition of "adequate and effective protection," and at least
one developing nation has read the phrase as a mandate to ignore tech-
nological patents based on biological resources found in its territory.97
US. May Not Endorse Biodiversity Treaty at Earth Summit, U.S. Delegation Leader Says, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 292 (May 20, 1992).
89. Treaty Interferes with Principles of Patent Protection, U.S. Official Says, Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA), at 407 (June 17, 1992).
90. Julia Preston, A Biodiversity Pact with a Premium, WASH. POST, June 9, 1992, at A16.
91. US. Industry Waiting to See if Competitor Nations Ratify Treaty, Int'l Envtl. Rep.
(BNA), at 460 (Jul. 15, 1992).
92. Convention, supra note 62, art. 15(7).
93. The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, supra note 73, at 94.
94. Dianne Dumanoski & John Mashek, US. is Isolated in Opposing Biodiversity Treaty, B.
Globe, June 6, 1992, at 4.
95. Some suggest that "[t]he clauses that the Americans interpret this way are impressively
opaque." The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, supra note 73, at 94.
96. Convention, supra note 62, art. 16(2).
97. Maura Dolan & Rudy Abramson, Nature Treaty Signing Begins without U.S., L.A.
TIMEs, June 6, 1992, at A16.
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Thus, the U.S. interpretations appear well-grounded in reality, partic-
ularly in light of the indistinct language of the text and other coun-
tries' reactions to it.
Even if the Convention text would not justify summary abridg-
ment of U.S. intellectual property rights by other nations, it might still
mandate more expansive compulsory licensing rules than the United
States currently allows. Article 16(2) of the treaty calls for "access to
and transfer of technology... to developing countries... under fair
and most favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential
terms." 98 Some U.S. industries feared that "most favourable terms"
would require broader compulsory licensing than is presently accepted
under prevailing U.S. standards and that "preferential terms" would
lead to non-free market licensing.99
Several technological trade groups had urged the United States to
oppose the treaty' ° and supported its refusal to sign the document. 101
Some commentators agreed with the U.S. government 10 2 that signing
the Convention would have impeded progress and hindered continu-
ing improvements in biodiversity protection, since it is always more
difficult to renegotiate a closed text. 103 Strong voices within the coun-
try argued in favor of signing the treaty and working out the details
later, in the interests of maintaining competitive advantages and a
leadership role for the United States. 1°4 Some maintained that the re-
fusal to adhere to the Convention might place U.S. companies at a
disadvantage, since species-rich countries might limit access to their
genetic resources to those industries from signatory nations. 0 5 The
98. Convention, supra note 62, art. 16(2).
99. "To some biotech analysts, vague and legalistic passages in the treaty open the way to a
nightmare scenario of compulsory licensing," which would require licensing of products and
technology on preferential terms. Stone, supra note 65, at 1624. The U.S. government does not
want to legally oblige private entities to provide preferential transfer of technology. U.S. May Not
Sign Biological Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, at I.
The United States is currently pressing in GATT negotiations for stronger international pro-
tection of intellectual property rights and reduced compulsory licensing. There was some concern
that agreeing to the ambiguous and controversial provisions of the Convention would compro-
mise the U.S. position and inhibit U.S. negotiators in GATT rounds. Treaty Interferes with Prin-
ciples of Patent Protection, supra note 89, at 406. Coghlan, supra note 73, at 9.
100. Industry Officials Call Biodiversity Treaty Vague, supra note 66, at 511.
101. Coghlan, supra note 73, at 9; Stone, supra note 65, at 1624.
102. The United States "cannot sign an agreement that is fundamentally flawed merely for
the sake of having that agreement." Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 82, at 423.
103. C. Michael Hathaway, Yes: A Threat to Property Rights, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 42.
104. David P. Hackett, No: A Competitive Disadvantage, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 43. Some
employees of biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries like Genentech, Inc. publicly criti-
cized their companies' anti-treaty stances. Lehrman, supra, note 64, at 97. A director of Smith-
Kline Beecham mused that it was "puzzling that a number of other nations with a substantial
interest in the technology have somehow made themselves comfortable enough to sign the
treaty." Christopher Anderson, Industry Surprised by Firm U.S. Stance on Biodiversity Treaty,
NATURE, June 11, 1992, at 428.
105. U.S. Rio Stance Said to Hurt Competitiveness, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1992, at 5; U.S.
Stands Alone, supra note 2, at 415.
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treaty does not prohibit private contracts, though, and U.S. companies
remain free to negotiate royalties and technology transfers with other
countries. 10 6
Opposition to the Convention by no means commanded uniform
approval throughout the United States. The internal debate contin-
ues,10 7 and the future international effect of U.S. non-participation re-
mains unclear. Many observers claim that U.S. refusal to accede to
the treaty matters little. The United States contains comparatively lit-
tle of the world's plant diversity; whereas its participation (as a huge
emitter of greenhouse gases) would be crucial to the functioning of a
climate convention, the U.S. role in biodiversity issues is negligible.10 8
According to UNEP's director, Mostafa Tolba, the lack of U.S. partic-
ipation will not undermine the treaty, as the "North needs the South
in this agreement just as much as the South needs the North."10 9
Overall, U.S. discomfort with the Convention arose where the text
strayed from protecting biodiversity to regulating the results of bio-
technology."l 0 U.S. reluctance to participate in the Convention fo-
cused primarily on exceptions to intellectual property rights in
technology and potentially broad precedents on licensing that would
create serious disincentives for private investment in developing na-
tions. The principle of entitlements in raw genetic material for coun-
tries which have preserved these resources remains generally
acceptable in the United States."1'
106. US. Stands Alone, supra note 2, at 415.
107. The debate continues, in part because the treaty will remain open for signature until
June 4, 1993. Convention, supra note 62, art. 33. Some predict that the United States will cave in
to pressure to sign on at some time before then. US. Rio Stance Said to Hurt Competitiveness,
supra note 105, at 5. Dolan & Abramson, supra note 97, at A16. The fact that then-Senator
Albert Gore had publicly decried U.S. refusal to participate in lieu of working to improve some
particular provisions, U.S. Stands Alone, supra note 2, at 415, leads to speculation that the new
Administration may alter the U.S. stance.
108. U.S. Says It Won't Sign Biodiversity Treaty, CHIC. TRIa., May 30, 1992, at 2; U.S. May
Not Endorse Biodiversity Treaty at Summit, U.S. Delegation Says, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 292
(May 20, 1992).
109. Dolan & Abramson, supra note 97, at A17. The Convention may create a new, global
standard of access to plant germplasm, and - with the signatures of most of the world's nations,
including specially-affected countries - the treaty may carry some weight as customary interna-
tional law. The question of what legal effect the Convention would have on the United States as
a dissenting state is practically moot, because U.S. firms will most likely have to abide by or one-
up the terms of the Convention in order to compete with other firms offering financial and tech-
nological benefits. Hackett, supra note 104, at 43. "At this point, the only sure thing about the
biodiversity treaty is this: The next rosy periwinkle won't be free." Stone, supra note 65, at 1624.
110. Treaty Interferes with Principles of Patent Protection, supra note 89, at 407.
111. According to State Department officials, the United States agrees with the principle that
underdeveloped nations should be compensated for use of their genetic resources. Jane Perlez,
Environmentalists Accuse U.S. of Trying to Weaken Global Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1992, at
B7.
Winter 1993]
Michigan Journal of International Law
C. Reconciling Rights in Natural Plants with Existing Intellectual
Property Laws: A Comparative Analysis
By signing the Convention, many nations implicitly accepted the
concept of granting property rights in naturally-occurring plant ge-
netic materials. Only the United States rejected the Convention, be-
cause its broad language seemed aimed at diluting existing patent
prerogatives in technology. Yet, U.S. intellectual property law recog-
nizes ownership rights in new, invented or discovered living plant spe-
cies. The prospect of rights in plant genetic materials found and
protected within a country's borders is fundamentally compatible with
U.S. intellectual property law.
1. The United States
The United States, the first nation to allow patents on plant genetic
material, protects plants under the most expansive system of intellec-
tual property rights in the world.11 2 A U.S. plant breeder may choose
among three statutory options under which to shelter a new, geneti-
cally-engineered or discovered plant species: the utility Patent Act, the
Plant Patent Act, and the Plant Variety Act.
U.S. law permits the protection of new plant varieties under the
general, utility patent statute."13 The Supreme Court ended the 'prod-
uct of nature' ban on patenting in 1980,114 and ruled in 1985 that the
availability of plant patents and plant breeders' rights certificates did
not preclude the possibility of utility patents for plants as well. 1 5
Utility patents provide the strongest rights entitlements of all U.S.
plant protection systems, but they also require the most stringent stan-
dards of novelty and are only available for invented, not discovered,
species. 116
Congress passed the Plant Patent Act in 1930 to further extend
patent rights to anyone who "invents or discovers and asexually repro-
duces any distinct and new variety of plant" except any "tuber-propa-
112. JUMA, supra note 21, at 149; Howard J. Brooks & Charles F. Murphy, Ownership of
Plant Genetic Material, in BIOTic DIVERSITY AND GERMPLASM PRESERVATION 493, 496
(Lloyd Knutson & Allan K. Stoner eds., 1989).
113. 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988).
114. In the United States "anything under the sun that is made by man" may be patented.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). Now that technological innovations allow
clearer definitions of plant species, assigning definitive property rights in species is much more
feasible. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 294. In addition, deposit samples of cultures, cells, tissues, etc.
are now allowed to take the place of the § 112 written description and enabling disclosure. Baker,
supra note 4, at 532-33.
115. Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (1985). Two years later, in 1987, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office began accepting applications for the "patenting of genetically-manipulated
non-human multicellular living organisms." JUMA, supra note 21, at 164.
116. Bernhard Bergmans, Industrial Property & Biological Diversity of Plant and Animal Spe-
cies, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 600, 607 (1990).
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gated plant." 117 In creating this patent legislation, Congress intended
to stimulate a field of endeavor that had not yet blossomed into an
industry and to vitiate the judicial interpretation that products of na-
ture did not comprise statutory subject matter.118 A would-be plant
patentee can apply once she invents or discovers a new and distinct
variety of plant and reproduces it asexually.11 9 The patent owner's
rights grant the ability to "exclude others from asexually reproducing
the plant or selling or using" it.120 However, the sale or use of distinct
mutants which arise from the plant, 121 the sexual (seed) reproduction
of the plant, and the independent development by one who breeds a
similar variety do not infringe the patent.1 22 To date, over 6,000
plants have been patented under the U.S. Plant Patent Act.123
The 1930 Plant Patent Act excluded sexually reproduced plants
(the majority of higher plant species), but in 1970 Congress passed the
Plant Variety Protection Act to protect sexually reproduced plants
through a system of plant breeders' rights. 24 Designed to stimulate
breeders and discoverers to uncover new varieties for the public benefit
and to promote progress in agriculture,125 the Plant Variety Protection
Act provides patent-like protection to sexually reproduced plants
through a registration process which issues certificates.1 26
U.S. plant breeders' rights differ from patents in several important
ways. Plant breeders' rights encompass sexually reproduced plants,
whereas plant patents are available predominantly for asexually repro-
ducing species. Plant breeders' rights protect the product only; pat-
ents shelter not only the product but also the process creating it.127
Breeders' rights proscribe a wider range of infringing activities, includ-
ing sexually reproducing the protected variety or using it to produce a
117. 35 U.S.C. § 161 et. seq. (1988). The exception for tuber-propagated species (which in-
clude the Irish potato and the Jerusalem artichoke) stems from the fact that this plant group
propagates by the same part of the plant that is sold as food. 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS
§ 1.05(1) (1991). Congress intentionally relaxed the disclosure requirement, 35 U.S.C. § 112(1988), by declaring no plant patent invalid if its "description is as complete as is reasonably
possible." 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1988).
118. In Re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 982 (1979).
119. ERNEST BAINBRIDGE LIPSCOMB III, LIPSCOMB's WALKER ON PATENTS 176 (3d ed.
1986).
120. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1988).
121. JUMA, supra note 21, at 159.
122. CHIsUM, supra note 117, at 1-272.
123. Brooks & Murphy, supra note 112, at 494.
124. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1988); LIPscoMB, supra note 119, at 177.
125. JUMA, supra note 21, at 152. Baker, supra note 4, at 530.
126. CHISUM, supra note 117, at 1-273. Registration under the PVPA requires no examina-
tion for nonobviousness. One who discovers or develops "any novel variety of [a] sexually repro-
duced plant," 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1988), need only reproduce it. A distinct, uniform, and stable
species satisfies the PVPA novelty requirement. 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1988).
127. JUMA, supra note 21, at 164.
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hybrid or different variety.' 28
The Plant Variety Protection Act exempts specific activities of
farmers and researchers from liability for infringement of plant breed-
ers' rights.129 Also, unlike a patent, a grant of plant breeders' rights
may be susceptible to compulsory licensing. While a patent-holder
may choose to license, sell, or ignore her product, national authorities
may force a breeder to license a novel plant variety to others at a "rea-
sonable royalty" if "necessary to ensure an adequate supply of fiber,
food, or feed... [when] the owner is unwilling or unable to supply the
public needs for the variety at a price which may reasonably be
deemed fair."130 Thus, plant breeders' rights balance societal requi-
sites against private ownership rights slightly more than patents.
The United States recognizes intellectual property rights in many
discovered or carefully bred and protected plant species. Therefore,
the claim implicit in the 1992 Convention that countries have property
entitlements in the plant species within their borders falls within ac-
cepted U.S. legal standards.
2. Other Nations
In contrast to the United States, many other countries resist classi-
fying natural plant germplasm as patentable subject matter. 31 The
distinction many of these countries draw between property rights in
natural plant materials and in developed varieties seems arbitrary and
specious.13 2 The effort involved in maintaining or discovering useful
plant species is often equivalent to that displayed in creating or devel-
oping new varieties. Traditional farmers have cultivated and pre-
served landraces and primitive cultivars for centuries; discovering and
identifying a new plant species may require large investments of time
128. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(3)-2541(4) (1988).
129. Researchers and breeders can work for research purposes with plants protected under
the PVPA. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1988). Farmers, too, may pay one license fee and thereafter re-use
seed or even sell it to other farmers without infringing the breeder's rights. 7 U.S.C. § 2543
(1988). Farmers, though, tend to repurchase every two to three years because of genetic drift.
Note, Genetic Engineering: Innovation and Risk Minimization, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 100, 113
(1988). The research exemption in the regular patent law is much narrower than that available
under plant breeders' rights. John H. Barton & Eric Christensen, Diversity Compensation Sys-
tems: Ways to Compensate Developing Nations for Providing Genetic Materials, in SEEDS & SOV-
EREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 338, 342 (Jack R.
Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988).
130. 7 U.S.C. § 2404 (1988).
131. While U.S. law permits broad protection for plants, European nations separate "essen-
tially biological" products and processes from patent protection. R.S. CRESPI, PATENTS: A BA-
SIC GUIDE TO PATENTING IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 158 (1988). These nations deny patent
protection to plants "on bases which are more grounded in history and/or tradition than ...
reflective of the current state of legal and technological sophistication." STEPHEN A. BENT ET
AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY WORLDWIDE 167 (1987).
132. BENT, supra note 131, at 151.
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and knowledge. 133 No coherent reason justifies limiting patents to
plants discovered in a cultivated state. Unrecognized varieties in na-
ture are as effectively lost to humanity as are cultivated species. 134
Furthermore, biotechnology industries develop more quickly in coun-
tries, like the United States and Japan, which protect broad intellec-
tual property rights in practically all categories of biotechnological
innovation. 135
Many of the industrial nations that deny patent protection to natu-
ral plant species do, however, permit the granting of plant breeders'
rights. European nations adopted plant breeders' rights as an alterna-
tive to creating plant patent legislation analogous to the U.S. Plant
Patent Act. 136 Canada's Supreme Court proscribed the patenting of
living organisms as inventions due to the perceived inadequacy of writ-
ten specifications, 137 but Canada acceded to the UPOV Convention in
1991 after passing its Plant Breeders' Rights Act.138 The Canadian
Plant Breeders' Rights Act covers the asexual reproduction of distinct,
stable, and homogenous cultivars, breeding lines, and hybrids, 139 and
provides for the revocation of the rights of breeders who refuse to
comply with compulsory licensing. 14o
New Zealand ratified the UPOV Convention in 1961 and updated
its Plant Variety Rights Act in 1987 to attract breeders to supply the
New Zealand market, after concluding that the lack of breeders' rights
in neighboring Australia had inhibited overseas breeders from releas-
ing their plant reproductive material there. 141 New Zealand extended
plant variety rights to anyone who has bred or discovered a new plant
variety, 142 and Australia eventually did enact its own Plant Variety
133. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 304.
134. Jurgensen, supra note 34, at 326.
135. BENT, supra note 131, at 80. "Experience has shown that dynamic, research-oriented
companies and individuals gravitate to proprietary rights systems that afford maximum protec-
tion." Id.
136. Jurgensen, supra note 34, at 300. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 10,
at 261. Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention excludes plant varieties from patentabil-
ity, due to ethical qualms and to more rigid definitions of patentable subject matter than in the
United States. BENT, supra note 131, at 149. Living matter falls outside the "technical" or "in-
dustrial" categories used by some of these countries. Id. at 143. Nonetheless, breeders of new
plant varieties can apply to the EEC Plant Variety Rights Office for registration certificates
which bestow the "exclusive right to sell or produce the reproductive material of the plant vari-
ety." Susan Singleton, Plant Breeders' Rights, SOLICrroRs J., Sept. 27, 1991, at 1056.
137. Hayhurst, supra note 39, at 175. The Canadian Supreme Court held that the disclosure
requirements of the Canadian Patent Act cannot be satisfied by deposits of cultures or samples.
Id.
138. Id. at 180.
139. Id. at 181.
140. Id. at 189.
141. Catherine Brown, Protecting Plant Varieties: Developments in New Zealand, 18 VICTo-
RIA U. OF WELLINGTON L. REv. 83, 90-91 (1988).
142. Id.
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Rights Act in order to afford its breeders increased access to foreign
breeders' varieties. 143 Australian plant breeders' rights, however, ex-
tend only to plant varieties created by human intervention and not to
discovered species. 144
Most of the industrial countries belong to UPOV, which sets mini-
mum standards for plant breeders' rights issued in Member States and
requires reciprocal treatment among members.145 Plant breeders'
rights resemble patents as related but restricted forms of intellectual,
property rights in an end product. Both patents and breeders' rights
grant limited monopolies to compensate for service to society and to
stimulate inventive efforts, but breeders' rights are narrower than
those of a patent-holder. Patents confer practically unlimited rights of
exclusive control; plant breeders' rights permit researchers to breed
with the protected variety and farmers to reuse protected seed without
infringement liability.146 The UPOV treaty also allows the abridg-
ment of plant breeders' rights for "reasons of public interest." 147 A
1991 revision of the UPOV convention on the protection of plant vari-
eties148 now permits the bestowal of proprietary rights on discoverers
as well as breeders of new plant species.1 49 UPOV Member States will
be permitted to change their national intellectual property laws and
may consider revising their bans on the patenting of life forms, though
there will probably be strong opposition to this, particularly in
Europe.150
Although previously most developing nations were hostile to intel-
lectual property protection of plant varieties, many have been chang-
ing their minds. The 1991 UPOV amendments extended the period in
which developing countries may join until December 31, 1995 because
of a perception of profound changes in the attitudes of these countries
toward the protection of plant varieties.' 5' Although most African
143. Dean Ellison, A New 'Breed' of Intellectual Property Rights, 62 LAw INST. J. 743, 745
(1988).
144. Id. at 743.
145. UPOV, supra note 38, art. 3. Section 2403 of the Plant Variety Protection Act, the
legislation through which UPOV was implemented in the United States, extends protection to
breeders of other nationalities depending on their countries' reciprocity. 7 U.S.C. § 2403 (1988).
146. Barton & Christensen, supra note 129, at 340.
147. UPOV, supra note 38, art. 9. (uniform standards of plant breeders' rights).
148. Barry Greengrass, The 1991 Act of the UPOV Convention, 12 E.I.P.R. 466 (1991).
149. Correa, supra note 43, at 155. The amended rules also no longer proscribe double pro-
tection (the availability of patents and plant breeders' rights) of plant species. Greengrass, supra
note 148, at 467.
150. Robin Nott, Patent Protection for Plants and Animals, 14 E.I.P.R. 79, 83 (1992). Many
recognize, however, that a general reluctance to permit patents on biotechnological products as
well as restrictive research regulations in Europe have driven the most talented European re-
searchers to the United States. BENT, supra note 131, at 80.
151. Greengrass, supra note 148, at 466. These countries may desire a system of breeders'
rights (which can be tailored to their needs and includes fewer monopoly privileges than patents)
in plants, because having an intellectual property system in place will help them bargain for
[Vol. 14:322
Protecting Biodiversity
countries exclude plants, animals, and other biological materials from
potential patentability,15 2 Kenya's Seed and Plant Varieties Act grants
plant breeders' rights for any distinct, naturally-occurring breeding
lines or discovered varieties cultivated, held in collections, or de-
scribed in printed publications. 153 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
and Uruguay have begun to contemplate creating their own uniform
system of breeders' rights.1 54 Costa Rica has also started to recognize
the value of intellectual property rights, as its fledgling software export
industry and wealth of biological resources show signs of economic
potential.155
Thus, while some nations refuse to permit patents on plants, the
related concept of plant breeders' rights has already gained wide inter-
national acceptance. Many nations grant intellectual property rights
in new and distinct discovered varieties.15 6 The claim of developing
nations to a legally recognized property interest, such as a plant breed-
ers' right, in their discovered and protected plant species, as enunci-
ated in the 1992 Biodiversity Convention, can be harmonized with
legal principles established in the United States and in many other
countries.
IV. USING PRIVATE PROPERTY ENTITLEMENTS TO PRESERVE
PLANT BIODIVERSITY
A. Advantages of a System of Reciprocal Property Rights in Plants
Universally extending the concept of plant breeders' rights to dis-
covered plants would provide a legal framework for compensating de-
veloping nations for the use of their native germplasm and would
induce government action in these nations to conserve indigenous
plant species. The acknowledgment by developing nations, in return,
of patents and plant breeders' rights in biotechnological material and
breeding lines would spur private companies in the industrial coun-
tries to sell products to developing countries. The compromise is not
to negate all intellectual property rights in plant species, as would a
common heritage principle, but, rather, to continue on the interna-
tional plane the trend in many countries of investing those who protect
and discover valuable species with proprietary rights in the plant
material. 157
licensing, obtain access to protected materials, and avoid trade pressures from industrial nations.
Correa, supra note 43, at 157.
152. JUMA, supra note 21, at 231.
153. Id. at 173.
154. Correa, supra note 43, at 157.
155. New Measure Would Cover Extraction of Genetic Resources from Rain Forests, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 461 (July 15, 1992).
156. For example, the United States, New Zealand, Kenya, etc. as described above.
157. "If genetic resources continue to be available to all as part of our social heritage... we
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International agreement to expand intellectual property rights to
encompass the germplasm donations of developing countries would
improve upon the common heritage approach in several ways. First, a
system of property rights would furnish governments of nations rich in
species and germplasm with non-altruistic incentives to conserve bio-
diversity. Present conservation efforts place disproportionate burdens
on the poorest countries.158 If charged with the responsibility for
maintaining rain forests, governments of tropical nations must choose
whether or not to voluntarily forego modernization, use of their own
land, and receipt of foreign income (from farming, ranching, and log-
ging) for the benefit of the entire world. Giving the owners of natural
habitats intellectual property entitlements in their natural plant spe-
cies would provide an economic reason to conserve these habitats. 159
Different statistical studies arrive at different results,160 yet a recog-
nized right to compensation for efforts to catalogue and preserve plant
species, combined with carefully planned economic incentives and
government regulation, would spur conservation efforts more effec-
tively than would a general sense of responsibility for the planet and
an "unmanaged commons." 161
Another benefit of a property rights system would be the extension
of financial gain to countries that contribute the original gene pools
from which plant-derived commodities derive. At present, developing
countries often receive no remuneration for the use of their natural
germplasm resources, as they are unable to patent them. 162 With in-
ternational acceptance of proprietary rights in raw germplasm, not
only would plant breeding countries receive returns from their re-
search investments in biotechnologies, but gene-rich nations would
also receive compensation for discovering and conserving useful spe-
cies. 163 This would lead to an equitable distribution among nations of
the benefits of the products of research based on plant genetic
resources.164
can expect the uninterrupted continuation of the existing destruction of species." Sedjo, supra
note 27, at 312-13.
158. Id. at 301.
159. Michael A. Gollin, Using Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 193, 216 (1991).
160. One case study (on the conservation of seabirds in Iceland), for example, concluded that
under a "pure property rights paradigm" natural species "fared far better than under a com-
mons." Jon H. Goldstein, The Prospects for Using Market Incentives for Conservation of.Biologi-
cal Diversity, in THE PRESERVATION AND VALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 246, 262
(Gordon H. Orians et al. eds., 1986).
161. Id. at 248-63.
162. Birds and Bees, supra note 14, at 17.
163. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 311.
164. Id. at 308.
[Vol. 14:322
Protecting Biodiversity
1. Perspective of Developing Nations
The wealthiest countries contain the smallest and least interesting
biotas, while the poorest countries, burdened by expanding popula-
tions and limited scientific knowledge, preside over the largest. 165 Na-
tions rich in natural species but lacking technological methods and
products complain that, although private companies from developed
countries enjoy unrestricted access to all natural plant germplasm,
these companies adapt the germplasm into commercially valuable
forms protected by patents and sell the improved products back to the
developing countries at prohibitive prices.166
Developing countries frequently lack strong intellectual property
rights systems, preferring first to obtain access to important technolo-
gies and build up their patent protection schemes afterwards. 167 The
transfer of technology remains a key goal for them, and they believe
scientific improvements should benefit all peoples of the world.16 8 Pri-
vate companies, however, generally steer their products away from
markets where their patents do not enjoy protection.1 69 Thus, biotech-
nology, which will have a major impact on agriculture, 170 continues to
elude developing countries, and they close themselves off from techno-
logical advances.
Since many developing countries do not guarantee patent protec-
tion for biotechnology and other modem inventions, their students
often find impediments to their ability to study science abroad and
bring back needed information.1 71 Moreover, differing levels of adher-
ence to plant breeders' rights by countries tend to restrict the transfer
of genetic material to exchanges among UPOV Member States. 172 For
all practical purposes, large companies enjoy continued access to raw
germplasm while restricting distribution of their products by means of
secrecy and restrictive sales.
If species-rich countries had intellectual property entitlements of
their own that made enforcement of property rights in their economic
165. WiLsoN, supra note 6, at 272.
166. WWF Urges Governments, supra note 21, at 365. For example, when the highly lucra-
five drug vincristine was derived from the rosy periwinkle "not a cent" of the profits on its sales
"went back to Madagascar." Leslie Roberts, Chemical Prospecting: Hope for Vanishing Ecosys-
tems?, SCIENCE, May 22, 1992, at 1142.
167. UNCED Meeting, Ozone-depleting Substances Top International Environmental Agenda
for 1992, Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 54 (Jan. 29, 1992) [hereinafter UNCED Meeting]. Gold-
stein, supra note 160, at 248-49.
168. John Ntambirweki, The Developing Countries in the Evolution of an International Envi-
ronmental Law, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 905, 918 (1991).
169. Commercial industries sell only inbred hybrid crop plants (whose parent lines can be
protected by trade secrets) in countries which do not respect patent rights. Duvick and Brown,
supra note 48, at 508.
170. Baker, supra note 4, at 536.
171. JUMA supra note 21, at 127.
172. Id. at 157.
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interest, they would also find technologies more readily available to
them. 173 Tropical countries would gain from installing domestic intel-
lectual property rights regimes, for they could internationally enforce
some of their own claims of entitlements in plant genetics. Industrial
nations could improve international observance of their own patent
rights by training people to be patent office examiners in their coun-
tries,174 and these trainees would learn about molecular biology and
appraisals of patent and breeders' rights applications. 175
Other benefits of an intellectual property rights system to a devel-
oping nation include disclosure of enabling technologies in the local
language and increased availability of foreign technology in the coun-
try.1 76 Universities, governments, and scientists of various nations
would find greater opportunities to work together if the industrial na-
tions no longer feared misappropriation of their intellectual property,
and science programs would improve as a result.' 77
Developing countries often balk at paying to use patented inven-
tions, but they might be able to pay part of the fees with royalties
gained through initial licensing of raw genetic materials. Instead of
trying to reverse-engineer technologies, patent-respecting developing
countries would receive patent specifications that describe the inven-
tion in detail and facilitate dissemination of products and processes
after the monopoly period expires. Restrictive patent grants endure
only a limited time. Moreover, one can often invent around a patent
to develop substitutable products once one understands the
technology. 178
Access to technology and assistance in cultivating biotechnology
capacities would be a boon to developing countries, even at the price
of conceding observance of the intellectual property claims of devel-
oped nations. A labor-intensive field with low entry barriers and low
initial capital investment requirements, biotechnology is ideal for a na-
tion seeking to modernize.179 Kenya, for example, located near a rich
source of plant diversity, 180 boasts of a long tradition of farming re-
173. "The industrialization and economic strength of a country often correspond with...
the comprehensiveness of the country's intellectual property protection." Gollin, supra note 159,
at 214. "Experience has shown that dynamic, research-oriented companies and individuals gravi-
tate to proprietary-rights systems that afford maximum protection." BENT, supra note 131, at 80.
'174. JUMA, supra note 21, at 175.
175. Daniel J. Goldstein, Molecular Biology and the Protection of Germplasm: A Matter of
National Security, in SEEDS & SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC
RESOURCES 315, 329 (Jack R. Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988).
176. Gollin, supra note 159, at 215.
177. Goldstein, supra note 175, at 328.
178. Gardner M. Brown, Jr., Valuation of Genetic Resources, in THE PRESERVATION AND
EVALUATION OF BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES 203, 206 (Gordon H. Orians et al. eds., 1986).
179. JUMA, supra note 21, at 208. "Biotechnology ... is one of those few families of tech-
niques that are amenable to popular participation." Id. at 218.
180. Id. at 179.
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search 181 and could potentially take part in biotechnology research.18 2
One reason for an underdeveloped nation to take part in biotech-
nology research would be to conduct research programs that reflect its
own needs.18 3 Few individuals in developing countries live long
enough to run the risk of contracting cancer or heart disease, but
many urgently need particular medicines.184 Similarly, in agriculture
the private research sector of industrial countries presently focuses on
improving machine-harvestable crops, not a pressing concern in re-
gions with lower labor costs. 185 Species other than the major commer-
cial crops, such as millet and sorghum, receive little attention from
companies focusing on industrial agriculture, but serve as staple food
sources in many developing nations.18 6 By setting up intellectual
property regimes, gene-rich countries could demand enforcement of
their own rights in plant germplasm while acquiring technology to use
for their own needs.
2. Perspective of Developed Nations
Developed nations focus primarily on maintaining access to unde-
veloped plant genetic resources187 and shielding their grants of intel-
lectual property rights in technology. These nations believe that in
order to make it worthwhile for private companies to develop new
plant-based products, enterprises require assurances of solid patent
protection.18 8 According to industrial nations, without guaranteed
property rights and the attendant ability to sell compounds at market
values, private firms would create fewer new pharmaceuticals and ag-
ricultural varieties, and those who invented would be driven to protect
their creations by means of trade secrets. Absent the required full dis-
closure of production processes that forms the quid pro quo for patent
grants, researchers would waste time and money attempting to dupli-
cate each others' products, resulting in a general misallocation of re-
sources. 189 Technology-rich nations maintain that increased exchange
of information among plant breeders would result if more nations im-
plemented breeders' rights and that private industries would augment
their activities if their patents were universally acknowledged.
181. Id. at 176.
182. Id. at 203.
183. Id. at 225.
184. MYERS, supra note 10, at 99.
185. JUMA, supra note 21, at 84.
186. Id. at 85. "Instead of demonstrating the obvious, or chasing the trivial, molecular biolo-
gists in underdeveloped countries could be involved in the frontier of biological science.. .[per-
forming] projects of national and international importance." Goldstein, supra note 175, at 328.
187. Preston, supra note 90, at A16. Schlickeisen, supra note 63, at C7.
188. Baker, supra note 4, at 533.
189. Note, supra note 129, at 108.
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B. Considerations in Implementing a System of Intellectual
Property Rights in Plant Species
Successful international implementation of any system of recipro-
cal property rights in plant germplasm will necessarily entail concre-
tizing a number of practical details, including specifying the scope of
the system and defining a method of enforcing the property rights.
The theory underpinning the 1992 Biodiversity Convention could be
implemented in a variety of ways, depending upon the preferences of
negotiating nations. This section highlights some of the preliminary
considerations that would need to be examined in establishing an in-
ternational system of entitlements in natural plant species.
One of the initial problems confronting architects of a new struc-
ture in international environmental law would be determining who
would qualify for proprietary rights in natural discovered or protected
plant species. Approximately three billion of the world's people farm;
perhaps property entitlements should reward their efforts in the collec-
tion, improvement, and conservation of genetically valuable culti-
vars.' 90 Indigenous peoples may also have valid claims to property
rights in their knowledge of the plant materials in their environ-
ments.' 91 Any effective conservation measures must address the needs
and concerns of these groups, which may not be adequately repre-
sented by national governments on the international plane.
On the other hand, most destruction of the tropical forests occurs
on government-owned land.192 Ultimately, national governments
have the greatest effect on species conservation efforts. 193 Conse-
quently, declaring discovered plant genetic resources the property of
States in which they are discovered, subject to allocation by local pri-
vate property distribution structures, might have the greatest positive
impact on biodiversity preservation. 194 National governments could
determine whether to entertain claims by their farmers, finders, and
corporations or to use all proceeds from licenses for the collective ben-
efit of their citizens.1 95 Sovereign States might assign title as private
rewards and incentives to persons who locate new plant species or to
190. David Wood, Crop Germplasm: Common Heritage or Farmers' Heritage?, in SEEDS &
SOVEREIGNTY: THE USE AND CONTROL OF PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 274, 278 (Jack R.
Kloppenburg, Jr. ed., 1988). JUMA, supra note 21, at 232.
191. Robert F. Housman & Durwood J. Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Devel-
opment: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 592 (1992). About 88 of the "119
known pure pharmaceutical compounds used somewhere in the world . . .were discovered
through leads from traditional medicine." WILSON, supra note 6, at 321 (1992).
192. WILSON, supra note 6, at 159.
193. National governments control almost 100% of the major tropical rain forests (particu-
larly in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, Ghana, and Thailand), as well as act as sover-
eign authorities in regulating and taxing all land use. Gillis, supra note 51, at 160.
194. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 308-09.
195. Correa, supra note 43, at 154.
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those on whose land they are discovered.196 Individual states might
choose instead to set up a "large system of village-level landrace custo-
dians (a farmer-curator system) whose purpose would be to continue
to grow a limited sample of endangered landraces native to the
region." 197
Individual nations can best balance their own concerns with do-
mestic rural development, conservation of local resources, short-term
survival, and long-term agricultural self-sufficiency. Fee systems in
various countries will vary by ideology and local needs. 198 In addi-
tion, national sovereignty is a primary concern in the developing
world,199 and solutions to environmental issues particularly ought to
respect the independence of nations. General concord on the basic
premise of the right of control over germplasm, combined with a legal
structure of minimum standards, reciprocity, and a dispute resolution
procedure, would provide a sufficiently flexible, generally acceptable
framework.200
Nations could arrange specific accords under a general framework
through a multilateral, centralized structure or through a network of
individual negotiations. A bare minimum of international coordina-
tion would recognize a general duty of compensation and then treat
plant germplasm like any other natural resource.201 For example, a
nation with oil reserves may develop its own drilling capacities, negoti-
ate drilling royalties with petroleum firms, or sell some or all of the
drilling rights to a private company, which would take over develop-
ment entirely.202 Countries with raw genetic material might negotiate
with private industries or developed nations for scientific assistance,
technology transfer, and training of native breeders; 20 3 they might sell
the exploration rights to the highest bidder 2°4 or license several and
collect royalties;205 or they might simply hold on to the resources and
bide their time. As no one can know which species will be commer-
cially valuable in the future,206 natural plant species would be like ge-
196. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 308-09.
197. Altieri & Merrick, supra note 18, at 365.
198. Barton & Christensen, supra note 129, at 347.
199. Many of these States lack full confidence in the recognition of their own control over
their territories, due to pressures from economic situations, frequent political struggles, and his-
torical colonial dominance. Jos6 Goldemberg & Eunice Ribeiro Durham, Amazonia and National
Security, 2 INT'L ENvTL. AFF. 22, 24 (1990).
200. A unified global system would provide advantages over the current "dizzying array of
national protection schemes and treaty requirements." Jurgensen, supra note 34, at 293.
201. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 309.
202. Id. at 310.
203. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 19, at 198.
204. Note, Genetic Ark A Proposal to Preserve Genetic Diversity for Future Generations, 40
STAN. L. REv. 279, 309 (1987).
205. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 309.
206. Myers, supra note 51, at 20.
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netic lottery tickets; some would have no value and some would
eventually yield "jackpots." Thus, never knowing what portion of its
natural germplasm might prove valuable, each nation would have an
incentive to conserve all of it.2o7
More sophisticated international coordination efforts could estab-
lish a multilateral organization to oversee the use of plant germplasm
similar to the organizations which detect unauthorized uses of copy-
righted music selections on behalf of individual American musi-
cians.20 8 Under this proposal, seed companies and other germplasm
users might pay a blanket fee to a public or private international
organization in exchange for access to banks of plant material. Germ-
plasm donors would receive percentages of revenues from these
licenses based on the value of the plants they contribute to the central
organization. 20 9 A contributing nation would not receive any compen-
sation unless important genetic materials were found within its terri-
tory, and all would thus be inclined to become germplasm
exporters.210
A slightly different structure might create a central world office for
patent applications and registrations while allowing each nation to is-
sue patents according to its own criteria. The central office could
search the prior art (a difficult task for countries with limited re-
sources) and send the information and the application specifications to
all the nations designated by a prospective applicant.21 1 Each nation
could then determine whether an application satifies its novelty re-
quirement,212 and any one nation could deny or invalidate a patent
without affecting its legitimacy in other countries. National discretion
might mandate compulsory licensing when necessary to require distri-
bution of the patented product in the territory, to satisfy special State
interests, or to license dependent patents.2 1 3 Such a system could also
include infringement exemptions for experimental use in research.2 14
Other proposals have advocated taxing the sales of seeds and other
207. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 299.
208. The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast
Music, Inc. (BMI) monitor radio and television stations in the United States to detect copyright
infringement. ASCAP and BMI sell these stations blanket licenses, unlimited access to all their
members' works, and then distribute the royalties to the artists depending on the frequency of the
use of their musical compositions. So far, this system has withstood antitrust scrutiny. See Broad-
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
209. Barton & Christensen, supra note 129, at 348.
210. Id. at 349.
211. Jurgensen, supra note 34, at 318.
212. Id. at 324. The advantage in having each nation choose its own patent standards is that
developing countries could require a high disclosure levels which would enable them to "exploit
the technology after expiration of the patent or through a compulsory license should the patentee
fail to exploit the patent within the nation." Id. at 323.
213. Id at 328.
214. Id. at 329.
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biological products by large companies and allocating the proceeds to
different governmental, private, and international groups that preserve
diversity.215 A system of taxes would provide regular, predictable in-
come but would be difficult to enforce. 216 Furthermore, few nations
would probably accept an international tax scheme. Alternatively, de-
veloped countries might pay into a central fund (under the auspices of
the FAO or other international body) based on "size of national seed
industry, value of national agriculture production, frequency and size
of drafts" upon genetic storage facilities.217 A central funding mecha-
nism could research new specimens, file for patent rights on inven-
tions, and use any royalties received to invest in conservation
projects.218
C. Recent Examples Recognizing Proprietary Rights in Natural
Plant Resources
States with a wealth of plant germplasm, seeking the profits and
products accruing from natural materials for which they sacrifice to
preserve,21 9 are beginning to condition access to genetic materials on
the receipt of royalties and technical assistance. 220 On June 6, 1992
the presidents of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Nicaragua, and Panama signed a non-binding agreement of intent
to coordinate their legislation regulating the use of genetic resources
found in Central America.221 These nations intend to develop rules on
the export of biological materials and on technology and training in
exchange for access to land. As Central America currently has no
legislation on extracting plant species and other biological re-
sources, 222 this would be the first step towards developing a legal re-
gime addressing biological resource concessions in the area.
The pharmaceutical giant Merck and Company implicitly ac-
knowledged an obligation to compensate for the use of raw plant
germplasm in a much-publicized venture with the government of
Costa Rica. Merck has agreed to pay Costa Rica's National Institute
of Biodiversity (INBio) an initial fee of $1 million to undertake high-
tech chemical prospecting in Costa Rica's rain forests, and it will pro-
215. MCNEELY, supra note 3, at 120; MYERS, supra note 10, at 221-22.
216. Rackleff, supra note 60, at 425; Tyler, supra note 25, at 74.
217. Kloppenburg & Kleinman, supra note 19, at 198. Currently, botanical gardens in New
York and London require users of their plant materials to agree to pay fees to the developing
countries from which the samples come before starting any research. The Earth Conference
Biodivisive, supra note 73, at 93.
218. Rackleff, supra note 60, at 425.
219. UNCED Meeting, supra note 167, at 54.
220. The Earth Conference: Biodivisive, supra note 73, at 94.
221. Central American Presidents Resolve to Pass Laws Restricting Use of Resources, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 397, (June 17, 1992).
222. Id
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vide INBio a percentage of the profits on any drugs derived from
plants or microorganisms provided by Costa Rican researchers. 223
Merck teaches parataxonomy to local bus drivers, housewives, stu-
dents, and others 24 who collect samples of plants, "wasp glands,
snake venom, spider webs, ant hill matter, a wide array of fragments of
life,"'2 25 from which the company's researchers isolate compounds to
modify chemically.226 Merck donated $135,000 worth of technologi-
cal equipment to INBio, is training Costa Rican scientists in its own
laboratories,2 27 and will keep all patent and intellectual property rights
on any drugs developed.228
The Merck-InBio arrangement appeals to nations, like Brazil, In-
donesia, Mexico, Nepal, and Nicaragua, interested in making their
own wealth of species pay for its own preservation.2 29 Mexico and
Taiwan created national biodiversity institutes in 1992, and Argentina,
Chile, and Indonesia are considering following suit.230 Smith-Kline
Beecham is currently examining plants from Ghana, Malaysia, and
Costa Rica, and the National Cancer Institute is investigating biologi-
cal materials from China, Korea, Samoa, and the Red Sea.2 3' The
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) presently distributes information to de-
veloping countries about creating arrangements such as the one be-
tween Merck and Costa Rica. 232
223. Stevens, supra note 17, at C9. Birds and Bees, supra note 14, at 17. The government of
Costa Rica will preserve 25% of its land as a natural resource and funnel the pharmaceutical
royalties into conservation projects. Stevens, supra note 17, at C9. In a similar case, Smith-Kline
Beecham Pharmaceuticals isolated an extract with potential capacities to combat lung and ova-
rian cancers from a medicinal plant found by traditional healers. In a procedure which might
provide a hopeful trend, the company hired "bush masters" (at salaries more attractive than
those they make by slash and burn agriculture) to prospect the forests. The company filed for a
patent on the potential drug and will return some of the profits to the localities in which the
native bush masters found the plants. Id.
224. Roberts, supra note 166, at 1142.
225. Preston, supra note 90, at A16. Since the INBio program started in 1989, over 2.5 mil-
lion species of insects alone have been gathered. InBio Sets Precedent in Biodiversity Prospecting,
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION STRATEGY: UPDATE, Summer 1992, at 6.
226. These modifications are often necessary to make natural chemicals less toxic and more
absorbable in the human body. Leslie Roberts, The Drug Industry Goes Green, SCIENCE, May
22, 1992, at 1143.
227. Roberts, supra note 166, at 1143.
228. Deal Between Drug Firm, Costa Rica Called Example of What Treaty Would Do, Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA), at 398 (June 17, 1992). An important aspect of this arrangement is the
payment of money up front in order to permit conservation efforts to start immediately. Basing
all funding on hopes of uncovering a miracle drug and then apportioning royalties would delay
the conservation projects considerably, and simultaneous efforts to reduce economic pressures
leading to biodiversity loss (promoting ecotourism, encouraging the exploitation of renewable
forest products) are also wise. Roberts, supra note 166, at 1143.
229. Stone, supra note 65, at 1624. Roberts, supra note 166, at 1142.
230. Societies Sound Alarm on Biodiversity, SCIENCE, Aug. 14, 1992, at 876.
231. Roberts, supra note 166, at 1143.
232. Biodiversiy Treaty Called Highlight of Summit by Southern Conservationist, Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA), at 507 (July 29, 1992).
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Examples such as these demonstrate an emerging acknowledgment
of legal property entitlements in natural plant resources. Although
until recently companies perceived no obligation to compensate coun-
tries for the use of biological samples collected from tropical rain for-
ests, now more nations are requesting remuneration, and more
germplasm users, like pharmaceutical companies and the National
Cancer Institute, are acknowledging a duty to pay for the biological
materials which generate commercial products.233 Under a system
recognizing property rights in natural plant germplasm, a wide array
of benefits would accrue: companies would earn profits; local peoples
would receive compensation for their work and have a stake in the
outcome; the world's pharmaceutical storehouse would be enriched;
and the forests would be preserved so as to be able to shelter a wealth
of species diversity while helping to stabilize the planet's climate.234
CONCLUSION
Traditionally, the international legal framework for the conserva-
tion of plant genetic resources, especially those which provide valuable
resources for curing human diseases and ensuring adequate global
food supplies, has treated plant species as a common property re-
source. This legal model, though, offers no incentives to balance the
economic pressures for deforestation in developing countries and does
nothing to stem the catastrophic, continuing hemorrhaging of species
biodiversity.235 In negotiating the 1992 Convention on Biological Di-
versity, United Nations officials strove for a compromise including fair
compensation for transfers of technology by private companies with
compensation for those who protect natural materials, 236 thereby at-
tempting to foster environmental protection, societal development,
and the recognition of patent rights. 237 The resulting Convention em-
phasizes the possibility of intellectual property rights both in natu-
rally-occurring plant species and in the technological products derived
from these species.
Despite U.S. refusal to sign the Convention, the concept of propri-
etary entitlements for countries with species diversity falls within ac-
cepted U.S. legal standards, and other nations manifested their assent
to this principle by signing the document at Rio. In addition, recent
arrangements between industrial companies and species-rich countries
indicate a growing willingness internationally to respect the claims of
these countries to remuneration for use of the plant material located
233. Andrew Pollack, More Incentives to Save Vanishing Rain Forests, N.Y. TIMEs, March 5,
1992, at C9.
234. Stevens, supra note 17, at Cl.
235. Sedjo, supra note 27, at 312.
236. Biodiversity: Variety is the Spice of Life, supra note 22, at 53.
237. Ntambirweki, supra note 168, at 919.
Winter 1993]
356 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 14:322
on their soil. Thus, the Convention and evidence of recent practice
herald a shift in the focus of international law, and indicate an implicit
rejection of the common heritage approach to plant genetic resources
and the conservation of plant biodiversity, in favor of a potentially
more successful and equitable model balancing the needs and goals of
industrial and developing nations.
